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Direct Private Placements
William K Sjostrom, Jr.'
INTRODUCTION
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2
of securities
placement
private
HE
Oftentimes,
the key to a successful private placement is
small
businesses.
attracting an investment banking firm to serve as placement agent on the deal.
A placement agent brings two crucial attributes to a deal: a pool of accredited
investors with whom it has a pre-existing, substantive relationships (a pool),
and federal broker, state dealer, and agent registrations (registrations).'
Numerous companies, however, are unable to convince a placement agent
to handle their private offerings. Thus, some of these companies pursue direct
private placements, or DPPs.4 A DPP is a private securities offering to investors
without the aid of a placement agent.s In other words, it is an offering marketed
and sold directly to investors by company personnel.
For most companies, pursuing a DPP is daunting because they have neither
a pool nor registrations. Historically, the importance of a pool was greatly
magnified by the ban on general solicitation and general advertising applicable
to most types of exempt offerings. In July 2013, however, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted rule changes eliminating the ban for
Rule 506 offerings limited to accredited investors. 6 Hence, as discussed below,
lack of a pool is now a less significant impediment to a DPP.
Conversely, the registrations impediment remains but has received little
attention in the literature, perhaps because the efforts of the small business

T

I Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
2 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-i 3 -6 4 o, SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE

CoMMIssIoN: ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD

BE CONSIDERED I (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/66o/655963.pdf.
3 See id. at 4; see also VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N Div.
OF EcoN. & RISK ANALYSIS, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED
OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009-202 16 (July 2013), availableat http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf.

4 See Ivanov & Bauguess, supra note 3, at 3 (indicating that 87% of new Regulation D offerings
since 2oo9 did not use an intermediary).
5 I believe that this Article coins the terms "direct private placement" and "DPP." I view these
terms as analogues to the previously coined terms "direct public offering" and "DPO"which refer to
a public securities offering to investors without the aid of an underwriter. See generally William K.

Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public7hrougb an InternetDirectPublic Ofering:A Sensible Alternativefor Small
Companies?,53 FLA. L. REV. 529 (2001) (discussing the emergence and stability of internet DPOs).
6 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 5o6 and Rule 14 4 A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No.
69,959,78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239 & 242) available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf

[hereinafter Adopting Release].

947

948

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[ Vol. 102

community were focused on eliminating the ban on general solicitation and
advertising. Thus, below I examine federal broker and state dealer and agent
regulations as applied to DPP companies and their personnel.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of federal and
state regulation of private placements. Part II examines the historical ban on
general solicitation and advertising, its effect on DPPs, and the recent ban lifting.
Part III summarizes federal and state broker, dealer, and agent regulations and
discusses their application to DPP companies and personnel.
I.

PRIVATE PLACEMENT OVERVIEW

Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),' every offer and sale of
securities must be registered with the SEC unless the transaction or securities
fall within an exemption from registration.' Registering an offering with the
SEC is expensive' and time consuming and is therefore not an option for most
small companies."o Instead, these companies conduct their securities offerings in
compliance with one of the registration exemptions included in the Securities
Act or promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act.
By far the most commonly utilized exemption for a capital raising
transaction is the so-called private placement exemption provided by Securities
Act Section 4(a)(2)/Rule 506.11 Section 4(a)(2) (formerly Section 4(2)) exempts
from the registration requirement "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering."1 2 This means that, as a general matter, public offerings must
be registered with the SEC but non-public offerings, or private placements, do
not. The Securities Act is silent on what does and does not constitute a public
offering, but the courts have filled in this omission.
The seminal opinion on the distinction is SEC v. Ralston PurinaCo.,'3 which
was issued by the Supreme Court in 1953. The case involved annual offerings
by Ralston Purina, a manufacturer and distributor of feed and cereal products,
of its common stock to select employees.14 In some years over 400 employees
7 Securities Act of 1933, 5 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).
8 See 15U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012).
9 See Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 535-38.
10 See id. at 58r-82.

in See Ivanov & Bauguess, supra note 3, at 7 ("Most Regulation D offerings are issued under
Rule 506,94% since 2009 ... which provides a safe harbor for the private offering exemption under
Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act .... ").
12 15U.S.C. § 7 7 d(a)(2) (2012). Congress added the "(a)" to section 4 in 2012. See Jumpstart
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-Io6, § 20(b), 126 Stat. 306,33 (2012). "Issuer"

is a securities regulation term of art that in the capital raising context means the company selling
securities to investors. See I5 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2012).

13

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 1z9 (1953)14 Id. at 120-21. The case focused on shares offered by Ralston Purina to employees who
"without any solicitation by the Company or its officers or employees, inquire[d] of any of them as
to how to purchase common stock of Ralston Purina Company."Id at 121.
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purchased stock, including many in various low-level positions."s At issue in
the case was whether these offerings were nonpublic and therefore fell within
the Section 4(a)(2) exemption.6'The lower court found that these offerings did
fall within the exemption, reasoning that "the intra-organizational offerings
of stock by [Ralston Purina], unaccompanied by any solicitation, which have
resulted in a limited distribution of stock, for investment purposes, to a select
group of employees considered by the management to be worthy of retention
and probable future promotion" did not involve a public offering.' 7
The Supreme Court reversed." It reasoned that the exemption should be
interpreted in light of the statutory purpose of the Securities Act, which "is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary
to informed investment decisions." 9 "Since exempt transactions are those as to
which 'there is no practical need for the bill's application,' the applicability of
§ 4[(a)(2)] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need
the protection of the [Securities] Act."2 0 Hence, "a transaction 'not involving
any public offering'" as used in Section 4(a)(2) is "[a]n offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves ... ."21The Court went on to say that
the availability of the exemption "turns on the knowledge of the offerees,"2 and
that "[t]he focus of the inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the
protections afforded by registration."23 The Court concluded that the employees
to whom Ralston Purina sold its stock "were not shown to have access to the
kind of information which registration would disclose," and therefore the
offerings were not exempt under Section 4(a)(2).2 4
It was, of course, left to the lower courts to flesh out how to determine
which offerees can fend for themselves and/or have the requisite access to
information, among other things. 2' Approaches to applying Ralston Purina
varied. Some courts emphasized the relationship between the issuer and the
purchaser,26 some focused on the sophistication of the purchasers, 27 and some

15 Id. at 121. ("Among those responding to these offers were employees with the duties of artist,
bakeshop foreman, chow loading foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician, stock clerk, mill
office clerk, order credit trainee, production trainee, stenographer, and veterinarian.").

16

Id. at 120.

17

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 200 F2d 85, 93 (1952).
18 Ralston Purina,346 U.S. at 127.
59 Id. at 124-25-

20 Id. at

12S.

21 Id.
22 Id. at 1z6.
23 Id. at 127.
24 Id.
25

See 7 B

J. WILLIAM

HIcKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF

1933, § 55:25, at n-45 (2d ed. 2013) (describing questions left open by Ralston Purina).
26 See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 68o, 69o (5th Cir. 1971).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221, x228 (D. Conn. 1969).
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stressed the type of disclosure made to purchasers and the number of offerees. 28
One attorney categorized the resulting Section 4(a)(2) jurisprudence as "a kind
of mishmash. The issuer is now told that all of these factors have something to
do with whether he has an exemption under Section 4[(a)](2), but he is never
given a hint as to the proper proportions in the brew. The saving recipe is kept
secret, a moving target which he can never be sure he has hit."29
Fortunately, the SEC has largely cleaned up the "mishmash" by adopting,
revising, and reconfiguring various rules, culminating with the adoption of
Rule 506 of Regulation D in 1982.0 Rule 506 serves as a "safe harbor" for
Section 4(a)(2); that is, if an offering complies with the conditions specified
in Rule 506, the offering will be deemed exempt under Section 4(a)(2)." To
fall within the safe harbor, the offering must be limited to accredited investors
and no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors.32 Rule 501(a) defines
"accredited investor." The definition includes banks, insurance companies,
mutual funds, and certain other specified institutional investors; individuals
with net worths in excess of $1,000,000, not including the value of the person's
primary residence33 ; annual incomes in excess of $200,000, or joint annual
incomes in excess of $300,000; and executive officers and directors ofthe issuer. 4
The safe harbor also requires that all non-accredited investors in the offering
28 See, e.g., SEC v. Cont'l Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 37, 157 (Sth Cir. 1972).
29 Ray Garrett,Jr., The Private Offering Exemption Today, in FOURTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG.
3, 1o-Iu (Robert H. Mundheim et al. eds., 1973).
30 Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, n,251 (Mar. 8, 1982) (to be
codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 230 & 239). Regulation D contains two additional exemptions, Rule 504
and Rule o5, both of which were promulgated under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act. Id. at 11,252.
Section 3(b) empowers the SEC to adopt rules exempting offerings of certain classes of securities
up to s5 million "if it finds that the enforcement of [the Securities Act]... is not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering." t5 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(I) (2012).
31 17 C.ER. § 230.506(a) (2014) ("Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the
conditions in paragraph (b) of [Rule 5o6] shall be deemed to be transactions not involving any
public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the [Securities] Act."). Note that compliance
with Rule 5o6 is a nonexclusive means by which an offering falls within Section 4(2). As Preliminary
Note 3 to Regulation D explains, "an issuer's failure to satisfy all the terms and conditions of rule
So6(b) (§230.506(b)) shall not raise any presumption that the exemption provided by section 4(a)
(2) of the [Securities] Act (15U.S.C. 77(d)(2)) is not available."17 C.ER. § 230.500, Regulation D,
Preliminary Note 3 (2014), availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2or3/33-9415.pdf (outlining
use of Regulation D in subsection (c)).
32 See V7C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2014); § 230.506(b)(2)(i). Technically, there could be more than
thirty-five non-accredited investors, or purchasers, so long as the issuer reasonably believes that
there are no more than thirty-five. Id. § 23 0. 506(b)(i).
33 See § 230.501(a)(I), (4),(5), (6).The primary residence exclusion from the net worth calculation
was added by Congress as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376,1577 (2010) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)) (amending the rules set in the Securities Act for accredited investors).
34 § 230.501(a)(6).
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3
are sophisticated, or that the issuer reasonably believes they are sophisticated. 1
Sophistication in this context means that a non-accredited investor "has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable
of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment," either in his
3
own right or with the aid of one or more purchaser representatives. 1
The accredited investor concept is central in cleaning up the "mishmash." If
an issuer excludes non-accredited investors from its private placement, as many
issuers do," it does not have to make a subjective sophistication determination
that could later be disavowed by the SEC or by a court. As the SEC explained:

[The accredited investor] approach is based on the presumption that
accredited investors can fend for themselves without the protections
afforded by registration and thereby satisfy the requirements of proposed
Rule 506(b)(1), without a separate subjective determination by the issuer.
The majority of commentators believed accredited investors as defined
osed Rule 501(a) have the ability to fend for themselves in larger
n
offerings contemplated under a Section 4[(a)](2) exemptive rule. The
Commission agrees with these commentators .... 3

As for access to information, Rule 506 requires the issuer to furnish any
non-accredited investors that purchase securities in the offering with certain
specified information about the issuer and the offering within a reasonable
time prior to the purchase.39 The rule contains no specific requirement that
the issuer furnish accredited investors with information, but it does essentially
instruct an issuer to provide to accredited investors any information that it
furnished to non-accredited investors.40 Further, the issuer is required to afford
all investors, whether or not accredited, "the opportunity to ask questions and
receive answers concerning the terms and conditions of the offering .... "
Additionally, Rule 506 (via Rule 502) prohibits the issuer and anyone acting
on its behalf from soliciting investors through "any form of general solicitation
43
or general advertising. . . ."42 I discuss this prohibition in more detail below.
As a general matter, anyone offering or selling securities must also comply
with the securities laws of the states in which they are making the offers and

35 See

§ 23o.506(b)(2)(ii).

36 Id. For the definition of "purchaser representative," see § 23 o.5 o1(h).
37 See Ivanov & Bauguess, supranote 3, at 3 (stating that in 2012 only io% of new Regulation
D offerings included non-accredited investors).
38 Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release
No. 6339,46 Fed. Reg. 41,791 (proposed Aug. 7,1981).

17 C.F.R. § 23 0.5 02(b)(1) (2014).
40 Rule 5 02(b)(i) includes a note that provides as follows: "When an issuer provides
information to investors pursuant to paragraph (b)(i), it should consider providing such information
to accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws." Id.
39 See

41 § 230.502(b)(2)(v).
42 § 230.502(c).
43 See infra Part II.
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sales, all of which, except for the state of New York," require registration, or
qualification, 45 of the offering with state regulators unless the offering falls
within an exemption." In 1996, however, Congress passed the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act ("NSMIA"), which, among other things,
preempts state registration requirements for"covered securities." 47 The definition
of "covered security" includes a security sold under Rule 506.48 In other words,
Rule 506 offerings are exempt from state offering registration requirements.
II.

GENERAL SOLICITATION AND ADVERTISING

A. Overview
The ban on general solicitation and advertising appears in Rule 502 of
Regulation D which is incorporated by reference into Rule 506. Rule 502
provides as follows:
Rule 502. General Conditions to be Met ...
(c) Limitation on manner of ofering. . . [N]either the issuer nor any
person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by any form of
general solicitation or general advertising, including, but not limited to, the
following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication
published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast
over television or radio; and
(2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited
by any general solicitation or general advertising....49

As you can see, the Rule does not define the phrase but does provide two
examples of what constitutes general solicitation.
The scope of the ban is critical to the availability of Rule 506 (as well as
some other exemptions) and thus the SEC has addressed it in a number of
no-action letters and releases. For example, in a 2000 release the SEC stated:
"[O]ne method of ensuring that a general solicitation is not involved is to

44 See I Louis Loss ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION 191 (4 th ed. zoo6) (noting that aside
from the requirement that each dealer file a further state notice identifying each security offered
and giving the name, address, and state of incorporation of its issuer, there are no other registration
requirements in the state of New York for securities other than real estate syndication and intrastate
offerings).
45 Some states the term "qualification" instead of"registration." See CurrentLegislation, Blue
Sky Laws: Uniform Securities Act, 3 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 2sS, 221 (1962) (citing I Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 46-63 (2d ed. 1961)).
46 See generally Louis Loss ET AL., supranote 44, at 155-222 (discussing states'Blue Sky Laws

pertaining to (s) antifraud, (2) registration of persons in the securities business, and (3) registration
of securities and identifying registration exemptions).
47 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. io4-290,
3416,3417 (codified as amended in scattered sections ofI5 U.S.C.).

§ 77r(b) (2012)
17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2014).

48 See15 U.S.C.
49

§ 102, 110 Stat.

(as mentioned above, the SEC issued Rule 506 under § 4(a)(2)).
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establish the existence of a 'pre-existing, substantive relationship. '5 Even
though the reference to "one method" indicates there are other ways to ensure
general solicitation is not involved, the existence of a pre-existing, substantive
relationship has become the de facto rule for establishing that a particular
investor was not obtained through general solicitation."
The SEC considers a relationship pre-existing if it is established prior to
the solicitation for the particular offering.52 The SEC considers a relationship
substantive if it "would enable the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf) to be
aware of the financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom
the relation exists or that otherwise are of some substance and duration."" This
is not the easiest standard to apply, but in a series of no-action letters the SEC
has signed off on the use of an investor questionnaire asking about, inter alia,
financial circumstances, education, occupation, and experience in investing in
private placements as proof of the requisite relationship.5 4
One of the effects of the SEC's narrow interpretation of what does not
constitute general solicitation or advertising is greatly increasing the difficulty
for a DPP company to secure investors for a Rule 506 offering. The company,
for example, could theoretically send out questionnaires to every person in
its region that owns a Ferrari sports car in an effort to establish the requisite
pre-existing, substantive relationships with people who are likely to be
accredited. However, it would have to do this well in advance of an actual
offering because of the pre-existing requirement, and given identity theft and
privacy concerns these days, it seems highly unlikely anyone would respond to
a questionnaire from a random private company.
Placement agents do not face the same obstacles because they presumably
have some name recognition, can offer the potential of multiple future
investment opportunities, and are subject to regulation requiring the safeguard
of client information. They also have a strong incentive to establish a pool of
accredited investors with whom they have the requisite pre-existing, substantive
relationships because they can essentially rent the relationships to a company
undertaking a Rule 506 offering. This is because implicit in the language "by

50 Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange Act Release No. 42728,
17 C.F.R. PtS. 231, 241 & 271).
51 See 2 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES: TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION § I.03[2] (A.A.
Sommer, Jr. ed., 2003); see also Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38
65 Fed. Reg. 25,843 (May 4,2000) (to be codified at

EMoRy L.J. 67, 107 (1989) (emphasizing that the staff has never rendered a favorable Rule 502(c)

opinion absent a pre-existing relationship).
52 See E. E Hutton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2917, at *2(Dec. 3,
1985).

53 Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 5985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2812, at *2 (Dec. 4, 1985).

54 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It's Time to Allow General Solicitation and
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (2004).
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or behalf of the issuer" in Rule 502(c) is the concept that the solicitor can be
someone other than the issuer, for example, a placement agent.ss
This regulatory channeling of Rule 506 deals through placement agents
works out fine for those companies that can attract a placement agent. Many
small companies, however, cannot and therefore may have no choice but to
pursue a DPP.
B.

LIFTING OF THE BAN

On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), a bipartisan bill designed "[t]o increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the public
capital markets for emerging growth companies."s6 In that regard, the Act
created two new securities offering registration exemptions, relaxed certain
requirements to make initial public offerings less burdensome for "emerging
growth companies," and increased the number of record shareholders threshold
that obligates a company to register securities under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.11
Additionally, the JOBS Act directed the SEC to eliminate the ban on
general solicitation and advertising for Rule 506 offerings limited to accredited
investors. Specifically, Title II, Section 201(a)(1) of the Act provides:
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Securities and Exchange Commission shall revise its rules issued in
section 230.506 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, to provide that
the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising contained
in section 230.502(c) of such title shall not apply to offers and sales of
securities made pursuant to section 230.506, provided that all purchasers of
the securities are accredited investors. Such rules shall require the issuer to
take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited
investors, using such methods as determined by the Commission.s"

The SEC proposed amendments to Rule 506 to implement Section
201(a) on August 29, 201259 and adopted them with minimal modification on
July 10, 2013.60 The amendments went into effect on September 23, 2013.61
Among other things, the amendments added a new subsection (c) to
Rule 506 providing that the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising
55 See H. B. Shaine & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2004 at *I
(May 1,1987) ("[I]n most cases a substantive relationship must exist between the issuer or its agents
and the offerees ... .") (emphasis added).

56 JOBS Act pmbl., Pub. L. No. iz2-ro6, 126 Stat. 306 (202).
57 See id. tits. 1,111, & VI.
58 Id.

§ 2o(a)(I).

59 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule
506 and Rule 44.A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9354, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (proposed rule
Aug. 29, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239) [hereinafter Proposing Release].
60 See Adopting Release, supra note 6.

61 Id
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generally applicable to Rule 506 offerings does not apply if: (1) all purchasers
of securities sold in the offering are accredited investors; and (2) the issuer took
reasonable steps to verify that all such purchasers are accredited investors.6 2
Requirement (2) seems redundant but is not because the definition of accredited
investor includes an investor whom the issuer "reasonably believes" is accredited
even though the investor is not actually accredited.6 1 For example, a person the
issuer reasonably believes has a net worth in excess of $1 million excluding
home equity, is an accredited investor even if her net worth is actually $500,000.
Apparently, an issuer can form the requisite reasonable belief without taking
reasonable steps to verify an investors accredited status.Thus, the drafters of the
JOBS Act presumably concluded a stricter requirement is warranted for Rule
506 offerings involving general solicitation. As the SEC stated, "we believe that
the purpose of the verification mandate is to address concerns, and reduce the
risk, that the use of general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings could result in
sales of securities to investors who are not, in fact, accredited investors."64
The SEC decided to go with a "principles-based" approach to what
constitutes reasonable verification as opposed to specifying required methods
of verification. 6 s Thus, "whether the steps taken are 'reasonable'. . . [requires]
an objective determination by the issuer (or those acting on its behalf), in
the context of the particular facts and circumstances of each purchaser and
transaction."6 6 The SEC reasoned that such an approach "give[s] issuers and
market participants the flexibility to adopt different approaches to verification
depending on the circumstances, to adapt to changing market practices, and to
implement innovative approaches to meeting the verification requirement, such
as the development of third-party databases of accredited investors." 7
The SEC supplemented its principles-based approach by including a list
of methods that are deemed reasonable for verifying that a "natural person"
purchaser is accredited. The list consists of the following four methods:
*

Verifying the purchaser's annual income ($200,000 plus or $300,000 plus
jointly with spouse) by reviewing copies of IRS forms that report income
(e.g., 1040, W-2, 1099) for the two most recent years and obtaining a
written representation from the purchaser that he or she expects the same or
a greater level of income in the current year;"

*

For the purpose of verifying the purchaser's net worth ($1,000,000 plus
excluding home equity), verifying assets by reviewing recent bank statements,

62 See 17 C.ER.

§ 230.506(c)

(2014).

63 17 C.ER. § 230.501(a) (2014) ("Accredited investor shall mean any person who comes
within any of the following categories, or wbo the issuer reasonablybelieves comes within any of the
following categories, at the time of the sale of the securities to that person .... ") (emphasis added).
64 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 19.
65 See id. at 2o.
66 Id. at 19-20.
67 Proposing Release, supra note 59, at 25.
68 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(i), (2)(ii)(A).
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brokerage statements, tax assessments, and appraisal reports and verifying
liabilities by reviewing a credit report on the purchaser and obtaining a
written representation from the purchaser that "all liabilities necessary to
make a determination of net worth have been disclosed;""
*

Obtaining a written confirmation from a registered broker-dealer,
registered investment adviser, licensed attorney, or registered certified public
accountant "that such person or entity has taken reasonable steps to verify
that the purchaser is an accredited investor within the prior three months
and has determined that such purchaser is an accredited investor;"o or

*

With respect to a person who purchased securities from the issuer in a Rule
506 offering as an accredited investor prior to adoption of Rule 506(c),
"obtaining a certification by such person at the time of sale that he or she
qualifies as an accredited investor."7

Note that "[t]he issuer is not required to use any of these methods in verifying
the accredited investor status of natural persons who are purchasers. These
methods are examples of the types of non-exclusive and non-mandatory
methods that satisfy the verification requirement in §230.506(c)(2)(ii)." 72
A key aspect of Rule 506(c) is its application to purchasers as opposed to
offerees.This means a company can market a Rule 506(c) offering by any means
and through any medium without concern for whether its marketing efforts
reach non-accredited investors so long as it only allows accredited investors
to purchase securities in the offering. Thus, a company, can for example, use
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and even Google AdWords to market its offering.
And, of course, it can contact all Ferrari owners too.
The company will still have to convince potential investors to reveal
information they likely view as private and sensitive. At least, however, a DPP
company will get to pitch the investment opportunity and perhaps generate
some excitement before making the delicate request for sensitive information,
unlike pre-Rule 506(c) where it would have to make such a request well in
advance of pitching a deal.
Furthermore, as the SEC notes:
[I]n the future, services may develop that verify a person's accredited investor
status for purposes of new Rule 506(c) and permit issuers to check the
accredited investor status of possible investors, particularly for web-based
Rule 506 offering portals that include offerings for multiple issuers. This
third-party service, as opposed to the issuer itself, could obtain appropriate
documentation or otherwise take reasonable steps to verify accredited
investor status.'

Investors are likely to be more comfortable sharing information with an
established and reputable third-party verifier as opposed to the company itself.

69 See id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(B).
7o See id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(C).
71 See id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(D).
72 Id. at Instructions to § 23 0. 5 06(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D).
73 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 33 n.iz3.
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Such a verifier will undoubtedly charge a fee to the company for providing the
verification but it will likely be significantly less than what a placement agent
charges for accessing its pool of accredited investors. I also suspect that verifiers
will be much less picky than placement agents as to the companies to whom
they are willing to provide services.
Note that in connection with adopting Rule 506(c), the SEC put out for
comment some amendments to Regulation D, some of which relate to Rule
506(c). 7 4
III.

BROKER, DEALER, AND AGENT REGULATION

Both federal and state law regulate persons who buy or sell securities for
the accounts of others or their own accounts.'Ihis section discusses application
of these laws to DPP companies and personnel. These laws are generally a
non-issue with respect to a private placement undertaken for a company by
a placement agent because the placement agent and its employees will already
have the requisite registrations in place.
A. FederalBroker Regulation
Subject to limited exceptions," Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act) makes it unlawful for a "broker" to effect transactions
in securities unless registered with the SEC.76 Exchange Act Section 3(a)(4)(A)
defines broker as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others."77 The rub when it comes to DPPs is that
the definition of broker arguably ensnares an employee of a company pursuing a
DPP engaged in soliciting investors for the offering.78 Registering the employee
74 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Release No. 946,
Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, 78 Fed. Reg. 44, 8o6 (proposed July 1o, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2O13/33-94i6.pdf
("Specifically, the proposed amendments to Regulation D would require the filing of a Form D in
Rule 506(c) offerings before the issuer engages in general solicitation; require the filing of a closing
amendment to Form D after the termination of any Rule 5o6 offering; require written general
solicitation materials used in Rule 506(c) offerings to include certain legends and other disclosures;
require the submission, on a temporary basis, of written general solicitation materials used in Rule
5o6(c) offerings to the Commission; and disqualify an issuer from relying on Rule 5o6 for one year
for future offerings if the issuer . . .did not comply, within the last five years, with Form D filing
requirements in a Rule 5o6 offering.").
75 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (204) (establishing an exemption for certain foreign brokers
and dealers);

17

C.F.R.

§

240.15a-ro (2014) (establishing an exemption for certain brokers and

dealers with regards to security futures products).
76 See

15U.S.C. § 78o(a)-(b)

77 15U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A)

(202).

(2012).

78 See Exchange Act Release No. 13,195, 1977 WL 174i1o, at *i (Jan. 21, 1977) ("[T]he persons
acting on behalf of the issuer in distributing its securities may, depending on the circumstances,
be ... brokers ... within the meaning of Section 3(a)(4) ... of the [Exchange] Act."). A DPP issuer
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as a broker is not really an option because of the time and expense involved."
Furthermore, registration triggers a host of regulations whose compliance with
involves substantial time and expense.s0
There is a fair amount of guidance from the SEC and courts on when
an employee of an issuer falls under the definition of broker." This guidance
indicates that it is a fact specific inquiry with the following factors relevant for
making a determination: *

Has the person previously worked for a brokerage house?

*

Was the person hired specifically to sell securities?

*

Does the person have duties other than selling securities?

*

Is the person's compensation tied to the sale of securities?

*

Will the person's employment to continue beyond offering?"

Previous work for a brokerage house, being hired by the issuer specifically
to sell securities, having little or no duties other than selling securities,
being compensated based upon success in selling the issuer's securities, and
employment ending when the offering ends all point towards the person falling
under the definition of broker."

does not fall under the definition of broker because it is selling securities for its own account and

not for the account of others. See id.("[T]he Act has customarily been interpreted not to require the
issuer itself to register as either a broker or a dealer; the issuer would not be effecting transactions
for the account of others nor, generally, would it be engaged in the business of both buying and
selling securities for its own account.").
79 See Broker-Dealer RegistrationandFINRA MembershipApplication,PROSKAUER (Sept.2011),
available at http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/broker-dealer/Broker-Dealer-Registration-

FINRA-Membership-App.pdf (describing time and expense involved in registering).
80 See generally David A. Lipton,A Primeron Broker-DealerRegistration,36 CATH. U. L. REV.
899, 906-08 (1987)-

81 See, e.g., Midland-Guardian Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 181,947
(Dec. 27, 1978); North Albuquerque Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,958 (Aug. 18, 1978); China Trade Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,939 (July 24,1978); Itt Fin. Corp. SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,943
(July 17, 1978); Bonded Scotch Invs., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 10625 (Oct. 12, 1975);
Corp. Inv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 1o74 (Apr. 20, 1974); Altman Homes, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8787 (Mar. 2, 1974); Partners in Housing Choice Cmty Inc. Morris
Mitgram, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 7622 (Dec. 29, 1972); Stratford of Tex., Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,o99 (Nov. 6,1972); The Woodmoor Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 19786 (Mar. 5,1972); Landcom, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 197 WL
6435 (June 5, 1971); see also; SEC v. Bravata, No. 09-12950, 2009 VL 2245649, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
July 27, 2009); SEC v. Rabinovich & Assocs., LP, No. 0 7 Civ. io54 7(GEL), 2008 WL 4937360, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2008); SEC v. Martino, 255 E Supp. 2d 268, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
82 See CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, FUNDAMENTALS OF BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 2- 28 (2d
ed. 2012).
83 Id
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In 1985 the SEC adopted Rule 3a4-1 under the Exchange Act in an effort
to provide further guidance in the area." The rule specifies a non-exclusive safe
harbor under which "associated persons" of an issuer who participate in sales of
that issuer's securities will not be considered to be acting as brokers for purposes
of the Exchange Act. 5 As the SEC explained:
Questions concerning the need for broker-dealer registration frequently
have arisen when an issuer proposes to sell its securities through its officers,
partners or employees rather than incurring the costs of employing the
services of a registered broker-dealer. The staff has historically responded
to these questions by providing interpretive advice or issuing no-action
letters. The Commission believes that a safe harbor rule is an appropriate
and efficient way to provide guidance in this area."

Associated persons of an issuer include officers, directors, and employees of
the issuer or of persons controlling the issuer.17 However, in the DPP context,
to fall within the safe harbor the associated person would need to meet each
of the following six conditions: First, the person cannot have been barred from
associating with a member of a self-regulatory organization, e.g., a brokerage
house." Second, the person must not be a partner, officer, director, or employee
of a broker or dealer." Third, the person cannot be paid a commission or other
remuneration based on sales of securities.9 0 Fourth, the person must primarily
perform substantial duties for the company other than selling its securities."
Fifth, the person cannot have been a broker-dealer or an associated person of a
broker-dealer during the preceding twelve months.92 Sixth, the person cannot
have, with certain limited exceptions, participated in the sale of securities of any
company during the preceding twelve months.93
Obviously, the rule is narrow. Employees of a company that is constantly
trying to raise money, which is the case for many small companies, will likely
run afoul of the sixth condition. Specifically, these employees will have solicited
investors in a different offering during the preceding twelve months and thus
cannot rely on the safe harbor for the next offering. 94 However, failing to
fall within the safe harbor does not create a presumption that a person is a
broker-dealer.95 A person involved in a DPP can still argue that her activities
84 Persons Deemed Not to be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No.
(June 27,1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
85

Id.

86 Id.
87 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.3a4-I(a), (c)(I)(i), (c)(s)(ii), (c)(1)(iii) (2014).

88 See id. § 240.3a4-l(a)(1).
89 Id. § 240.3a4-(a)(3).
90 Id. § 240.3a4-I(a)(2).
91 Id. § 240.3a4-I(a)(4)(ii)(A).
92 Id.

§

240.3a4-1(a)(4)(ii)(B).

93 See id. § 240.3a4-l(a)(4)(ii)(C).
94 See id.
95 Id. § 24 0. 3 84 -(b).

22172, 50

Fed. Reg.

27,940
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do not amount to engaging in the business of selling securities based on her
particular circumstances. The problem with going the facts and circumstances
route is that it injects uncertainty into the offering, uncertainty that can give
future potential investors, such as venture capitalists, pause. This is because
investors who bought through an unregistered broker may be able to rescind
their purchases under §29(b) of the Exchange Act.96
B. State DealerandAgent Regulation
1. Overvie.-All
subject to various
Uniform Securities
transact business in
under this chapter

states require the registration of dealers97 and agents,98
exclusions and exemptions. For example, the Georgia
Act (GUSA) provides: "It is unlawful for a person to
this state as a broker-dealer unless the person is registered
as a broker-dealer or is exempt from registration as a

broker-dealer . . . ."9" The GUSA defines broker-dealer, subject to specified

exclusions, as "a person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others or for the person's own account."'"
A company undertaking a DPP is selling securities for its own account and
therefore falls under this language. The issue then becomes whether another
provision of the GUSA takes a DPP company out of the definition of
broker-dealer or exempts it from registration. The answer is yes, the GUSA
states that the term broker-dealer does not include an issuer. 101
Likewise, the GUSA provides: "[i]t is unlawful for an individual to transact
business in this state as an agent unless the individual is registered under this
chapter as an agent or is exempt from registration as an agent under subsection
(b) of this Code section."1 02 The GUSA defines agent, subject to specified
exemptions, as "an individual, other than a broker-dealer, who represents a
broker-dealer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities
or who represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales
of the issuer's securities." 03 An employee of a company who solicits investors
in the company's DPP is effecting or attempting to effect purchases of the
company's (issuer's) securities and therefore falls under the preceding language.
96 Securities of Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (2012) ("Every contract made in
violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder ... shall be void

97 Some states use the term broker-dealer instead of dealer. See, e.g., MicH. CoMP. LAWS §
451.2401 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 35-1-401

(2013); Wis. STAT.

§ 551.401

(2012).

98 Some states use the terms salespersons, salesmen, or associated persons instead of agents.
See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-201 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.050 (2012).
99 GA. CODE ANN. § io-5-30(a) (oo9).
1oo GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(3) (2009).
101 Id. § 10- 5 -2( 3 )(B).
102 GA. CODE ANN. § io-5-3r(a) (2009).
103

§ 10-5-2(3).
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The issue then becomes whether another provision of the GUSA takes a DPP
soliciting employee out of the definition of agent or exempts him or her from
registration. The answer is yes, if the person is not compensated for selling
securities in the DPP Specifically, GUSA § 10-5-31(b)(3) exempts from
registration as an agent "[a]n individual who represents an issuer with respect to
an offer or sale of the issuer's own securities .. . and who is not compensated in
connection with the individual's participation by the payment of commissions
or other remuneration based, directly or indirectly, on transactions in those
securities."oM
Most states have taken an approach similar to that of the GUSA in this
area, for example, provisions requiring the registration of dealers and agents
broadly defined subject to exclusions and exemptions. While the applicable
regulations are based on some version of the Uniform Securities Act in forty
states,os the regulations in nineteen states are based on the'1956 version,"o' the
regulations in four states are based on the 1988 version,0 ' and the regulations in
seventeen states are based on the 2002 version. 10s That leaves ten non-uniform
act states in addition to quite a bit of variability among uniform act states.
Hence, it is not really possible to generalize in this area. Instead, each state
needs to be separately examined. Consequently, to get a flavor for variability
from state to state in this area, I examined the relevant regulations of the fifteen
largest states by population. Specifically, as I did for the Georgia statute above,
I analyzed (1) whether a DPP issuer has to register as a dealer in the state, and
(2) whether a DPP issuer employee who solicits investors in the DPP has to
register as an agent in the state.
2. Florida Case Study.-Given time, space, and tedium constraints, I have
not included an analysis of each state statute similar to that of the Georgia
statute above. The Georgia analysis was fairly straight-forward.'Thus, to give an
example of a more complicated scheme, below is the analysis under the Florida

§ 10-5-31(b)(3).
105 See Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) $ 5500,2009 WL 2996890 (2013) (listing thirty-seven states).
Georgia, Maine, and Vermont have also adopted this approach. Securities Act, UNIFORM LAw
COMMIssIoN, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Securities%2oAct (last visited Apr. 4,
104

204).

106 These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. PAMELA M. HEINRICH, NAFA
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SURVEY: ADOPTION OF UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (Oct. I2, 2012) http://
www.nafa.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2012o92o-NAFA-Uniform-Security-ActAdoptionAt-A-Glance.pdf.
107 These states are Louisiana, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah. See HEINRICH, supra note
106.
108 These states are Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. HEINRICH, supra note so6.
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Securities and Investor Protection Act (FSIPA)." My findings for the rest of
the fifteen states I examined are summarized in the table appearing after this
section.
Question (1): Does the FSIPA require a DPP issuer to register as a
dealer in Florida?
The starting point for the analysis is FSIPA § 517.12(1) which provides as
follows:
No dealer, associated person, or issuer of securities shall sell or offer for sale
any securities in or from offices in this state, or sell securities to persons in
this state from offices outside this state, by mail or otherwise, unless the
person has been registered with the office pursuant to the provisions of this
section."o

Unlike every other state I looked at where Question (1) turns in part on
whether a DPP issuer falls under the definition of dealer, Florida specifically
requires an issuer to register. FISP section 517.021(14) defines "issuer" as "any
person who proposes to issue, has issued, or shall hereafter issue any security."
Florida statutes section 1.01 defines "person" to include firms, associations,
partnerships, corporations, and "all other groups or combinations.""' Thus, a
DPP company is a "person" who proposes to issue securities, is therefore an
"issuer,"and thus appears to have to register.The analysis, however, does not end
there because FSIPA section 517.12(3) states: "Except as otherwise provided
in s. 517.061(11)(a) 4., (13), (16), (17), or (19), the registration requirements of
this section [i.e., the requirements quoted above] do not apply in a transaction
exempted by s. 517.061(1)-(12), (14), and (15)."112
Here is some background on FSIPA section 517.061. As mentioned above,
all states except New York generally require anyone offering or selling securities
in the state to register the offering with state regulators unless the offering falls
within an exemption."' FSIPA section 517.061 sets forth Florida's offering
exemptions. Section 517.061(11) is the exemption applicable to a private
placement by a business, and it closely tracks the requirements of a traditional
Rule 506 offering (i.e., one not involving general solicitation). 114 Thus,
historically, an issuer would not need to register a Rule 506 offering in Florida
because of this exemption. Since the passage of NSMIA in 1996, an issuer does
not technically even have to rely on this exemption because, as discussed above,
NSMIA preempted state offering registration requirements for Rule 506

§ 517.011 (2oo7).

1o9 FLA. STAT.
11o FLA. STAT.

inl
112

§

§
§ 517.12(3).

FLA.

STAT.

517.12(l) (2007)
I.O(3)

(emphasis added).

(2007).

113 Supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
114 FLA. STAT. § 517.o61(u) (2oo7).
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offerings." Whether an offering has to be registered in Florida is, however, a
separate issue from whether an issuer has to register. NSMIA only preempts
state offering registration requirements." 'his distinction is inconsequential
for an issuer undertaking a traditional Rule 506 offering in Florida because the
issuer is exempt from registering by virtue of FISP § 517.12(3). This is because
its offering falls under section 517.061(11) and thus is "a transaction exempted
by s. 517.061(1)-(12), (14), and (15)."n1 However, one of the requirements of
section 517.061(11) is that "[n]either the issuer nor any person acting on behalf
of the issuer offers or sells securities pursuant to this subsection by means of
any form of general solicitation or general advertising in this state.""s Thus, a
DPP company who engages in general solicitation in Florida, as allowed by
Rule 506(c), will have to register in Florida because its DPP will not fall within
§ 517.061(11).
Question (2): Does the FSIPA require a DPP issuer employee who
solicits investors in the DPP to register as an agent in the state?
As quoted above, FSIPA section 517.12(1) requires the registration of an
"associated person.""' Section 517.021(2)(a)(3) defines "associated person" to
include "[a]ny natural person, other than a dealer, employed, appointed, or
authorized by a dealer, investment adviser, or issuer to sell securities in any
manner . . . ."120 A DPP issuer employee who solicits investors in the DPP
is, at a minimum, "authorized by a[n] .. . issuer to sell securities," therefore
falls under the definition of "associated person," and thus appears to have to
register.121 As was the case under Question 1, the registration requirement,
however, does not apply to an associated person if the offering at issue is exempt
under § 517.061(11), but this exemption does not allow general solicitation
in Florida.122 Tus, if the DPP involves general solicitation in Florida, a DPP
employee will have to register as an associated person.
There is another wrinkle to the FSIPA analysis that potentially applies
to both Question (1) and Question (2). Specifically, section 517.061(11)
is not available for an offering where a "person defined as a 'dealer' in this
chapter is paid a commission or compensation for the sale of the issuer's
securities unless such person is registered as a dealer under this chapter."'23
115 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.1o 4-290,
3416,3417-20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of15 U.S.C.).

n16 Id.

§ 517.12(3).
§ 517.061(11)(a)(2).
up9 § 517.12(1).
120 FLA. STAT. § 517.o2(2)(a)(3)
17

s8

121
122

See id.
See id. § 517.061(11).

123 Id.

§

57.06i(n)(a)(4).

(2007).

§ 102, no Stat.
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Section 517.021(6)(a) includes within the definition of "dealer""[a]ny person,
other than an associated person registered under this chapter, who engages,
either for all or part of her or his time, directly or indirectly, as broker or principal
in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in
securities issued by another person."12 4 'The FSIPA does not define the term
broker but the term typically means a person who buys and sells securities for
the account of others. A DPP issuer employee who solicits investors in the
DPP would fall under this meaning because the person is selling securities
for the account of the issuer. Thus, the person is seemingly a "dealer" unless
he or she is a registered "associated person" (because of the carve-out from
the definition of dealer for registered associated persons). However, section
517.021(6)(b) provides:
The term 'dealer' does not include ... any person associated with an issuer
of securities if such erson is a bona fide employee of the issuer who has not
participated in the istribution or sale of any securities within the preceding
12 months and who primarily performs, or is intended to perform at the end
of the distribution, substantial duties for, or on behalf of, the issuer other
than in connection with transactions in securities.us

The bottom line is that compensating a DPP employee for selling securities
further complicates the issuer/employee Florida registration analysis in that it
may trigger required registration for both depending on whether the employee
falls under the language of section 517.021(6)(b) quoted above.
3. Summary of Findings.-Below is a table summarizing my findings from

analyzing the securities laws of the fifteen largest states by population. The
"DPP issuer registration?" column refers to whether a DPP issuer has to
register as a dealer in the specified state. The "DPP employee registration?"
refers to whether a DPP issuer employee who solicits investors in the DPP has
to register as an agent in the specified state.

124
125

§ 517.021(6)(a).
Id. 5 17 .021(6)(b).
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TABLE I

DPP employee registration?

State

DPP Issuer registration?

Arizona

Yes if transaction involves Yes if transaction involves
public offeringl 26

public offering 12 7

California

No128

No if not compensated

Florida

Yes if offering involves Yes if offering involves general
general solicitation'

Georgia+

1 32

NO
No

34

Massachusetts* No

36

Illinois

29

solicitation"'

No if not compensated'33
Yes if offering involves general

solicitation35
Yes if more than twenty-five
non-institutional offerees in
last twelve months3 7

Michigan+

No13 8

No if not compensated'39

New Jersey

Noo4 0

Yes if offering involves general
solicitation 4 '

New York

Yes

North
Carolina*

No'"

No 4 5

Ohio

No'"

No if not compensated

4

No if not compensated'

49

42

48

Yes1 43

1

Pennsylvania*

No

Texas

Yes if offering involves Yes if offering involves public
public solicitation"o

solicitation"'

Virginia*

2

No"1

Yes if offering involves general
solicitation"'

Washington*

No'14

Yes if transaction involves

1_

_

*Uniform Securities Act (1956) state
+Uniform Securities Act (2002) state

1_public offering"'
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126 Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801(9)(b) (2013), the term dealer includes "an issuer
... who, directly or through an officer, director, employee or agent who is not registered as a
dealer under this chapter, engages in selling securities issued by such iSSUER." However, per ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1844(A)(1) (2013), the dealer registration requirement does not apply to
"[t]ransactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
127 Per § 44-1801(22), the term salesman includes issuer employees. However, per § 441844(A)(1), the salesman registration requirement does not apply to "[t]ransactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering."
128 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25004(a) (2oo6) (excluding issuer from the definition of brokerdealer).
129 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25003(a) (2006) (including within the definition of "agent"
"any individual . . .who for compensation represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect
purchases or sales of securities in this state.").
130 See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 43-45 and accompanying text.
132 Per GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(3)(B) (2009), the term broker-dealer does not include an
issuer.
133 Per GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-31(b)(3) (2009), an employee who represents an issuer in a
DPP is not required to register as an agent if he or she "is not compensated in connection with the
individual's participation by the payment of commissions or other remuneration based, directly or
indirectly, on transactions in [the issuer's] securities .. . ."
134 Per 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.7 (2008), the term dealer is limited to those "offering,
selling, buying and selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by anotherperson .... "
(emphasis added). In a private placement, an issuer is selling its own securities and not those "issued
by another person."Id.
135 Per 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8A (2008), an employee of an issuer does not have to register
as a salesperson for offerings that fall under specified exemptions. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4G(I)
(2oo8) is the principal exemption for a private placement and it does not allow general solicitation.
In other words, if the private placement does not involve general solicitation it falls under 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/ 4 G(i) and therefore the employee would not have to register as a salesperson per
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8A.
136 Per MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. IloA, § 401(c)(2) (2005), the term broker-dealer does not
include an issuer.
137 Per § 4oi(b)(I), an employee of an issuer is not required to register as an agent for an
offering that falls under specified exemptions. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. iloA, § 4 02(b)( 9 ) (2005) is the
principal exemption for a private placement. It applies to an "offer directed by the offeror to not
more than 25 persons other than those designated in clause (8) [i.e., institutional investors] in the
commonwealth during any period of 12 consecutive months .... "
138 Per MICH. COMP. LAws § 45 I.2Io2(d)(ii) (2011), the term broker-dealer does not include
an issuer.
139 Per MICH. Comp. LAWS § 451.2402(2)(C) (2011), an employee who represents an issuer in a
DPP is not required to register as an agent if he or she "is not compensated in connection with the
individual's participation by the payment of commissions or other remuneration based, directly or
indirectly, on transactions in [the issuer's] securities."
140 Per NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(c) (West 2013), the term broker-dealer does not include
an issuer.
141 Per § 4 9 :3 - 49 (b), an employee of an issuer does not have to register as an agent for
offerings that fall under specified exemptions. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 4 9 : 3 - 50(b)(12)(iii) (West 2001) is
the principal exemption for a private placement and it does not allow general solicitation. In other
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As the above table indicates, throwing general solicitation into the mix
makes it trickier and, therefore, more expensive for a DPP issuer to navigate
state dealer and agent registration requirements. Specifically, two states, Texas
and Florida, essentially condition their issuer registration exemptions for a
Rule 506 offering on the absence of general solicitation.15 6 Likewise, six states,
Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Texas, Virginia, and Washington, or 40% of those
words, if the private placement does not involve general solicitation it falls under § 4 9 :3- 50(b)(r2)
and therefore the employee would not have to register as an agent per § 4 9:3- 49 (b).
142 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-e(i)(a) (McKinney 2012) ("A'dealer'shall mean and include
any person, firm, association or corporation engaged in the business of buying and selling securities
from or to the public within or from this state for his or its own account ....
143 See id. § 359-e(i)(c) ("A 'salesman' shall mean and include every person employed by a
broker or dealer as said terms are defined in this section, for the purpose of representing such broker
or dealer in the sale or purchase of securities to or from the public within or from this state.").
144 Per N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7 8A-2(2)(d) (2on), the term dealer excludes an issuer if securities
sold are "covered securities" under federal law. Per 15U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012), securities sold
under Rule 506 are covered securities.
145 Per § 7 8A-2( 9 ), the term salesman is limited to individuals who represent dealers.
146 Per OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.oi(E)(i)(a) (LexisNexis 2009), the term dealer does not
include an issuer.
147 Per § 17o 7.oz(E)(i)(a), the term dealer does not include an employee of the issuer if the
employee is not compensated in connection with the offering.
148 Per 70 PA. CONs. STAT. § I-102(e)(ii) (2013), the term broker-dealer does not include an
1ssuer.
149 Per § s-1oz(c)(i), the term agent does not include an employee of a DPP company who
solicits investors in private placement "if no compensation is paid or given directly or indirectly for
soliciting . . . ."
x5o Per TEXAs REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4, § C (West 2010), an issuer falls under the
definition of dealer but not with respect to transactions that are exempt under § 5 of the Texas
Securities Act. A Rule 5o6(c) offering will not fall under any of the § 5 exemptions unless the
offering does not involve public solicitation.
x5s Per art. 581-4, § D, the term agent includes employees of a dealer who solicit investors
in an offering. As discussed in note 139 above, an issuer falls under the definition of a dealer for a
private placement that involves public solicitation. In other words, if an issuer is a dealer, a soliciting
employee is an agent. Otherwise, the soliciting employee is not an agent.
152 Per VA. CODE ANN. § I3.1-50t(A) (2011), the term broker-dealer does not include an issuer.
153 VA. CODE ANN. § 13 .1-514 (B) (2011) exempts from agent registration requirements specified
transactions. Section s3 .x-5 4 (B)( 7 )(a) is the principal exemption for a private placement, and it
does not allow general solicitation.
154 Per WASH. REV. CODE § 2I.20.005(I)(a) (2011), the term broker-dealer does not include
an 1ssuer.

155 Per § 21.20.005(15), an employee of an issuer is not required to register as a salesperson for
offerings that fall under specified exemptions.WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.320(1) (20II) is the principal
exemption for a private placement, and it does not apply to sales involving a public offering. In
other words, if the private placement does not involve a public offering, it falls under § 21.20.320(1)
and therefore the employee would not have to register as a salesperson per § 21.20.005(15).
156 See supraTable I, notes 150-5i, 130-3i and accompanying text.
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examined, essentially condition their employee registration exemptions for a
Rule 506 offering on the absence of general solicitation."s7
Additionally, two states, Washington and Arizona, essentially condition
their employee registration exemptions for a Rule 506 offering on the offering
"not involving any public offering.""' As discussed above, this phrase is a term
of art under federal securities law. 5' Historically, an offering involving general
solicitation has been considered a public offering. As the SEC has stated,
"we have long construed general solicitation or advertising to impart a public
character to an offering." 6 Congress, however, broke from this history in lifting
the ban on general solicitation under the JOBS Act. Specifically, it included
an amendment to the Securities Act providing that "[o]ffers and sales exempt
under section 230.506 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations (as revised
pursuant to section 201 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act) shall
not be deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of
general advertising or general solicitation."' 61 'Thus, the issue is settled under
federal law but Washington and Arizona courts and regulators are not obliged
to follow federal law when interpreting analogous state law. In other words, the
question of whether a Rule 506(c) offering that involves general solicitation is
a public offering is unsettled under Washington and Arizona securities laws.
Further, five states, California, Georgia, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania,
essentially condition their employee registration exemptions for a Rule 506
offering on the employee not being compensated for selling securities.,62 State
securities regulators in any of these states who look disfavorably on DPPs
could apply an aggressive interpretation of compensation to force employee
registration and thereby stretch the regulatory net. For example, a regulator
could take the position that all employees of a company were compensated in
connection with an offering if the company would have had trouble making
payroll for a particular period if it had not closed on a DPP offering. I could see
this aggressiveness in light of the lifting of the ban on general solicitation. In
other words, these states may respond to the elimination of that impediment by
increasing the intensity of the dealer/agent impediment. You can imagine why a
state might so respond-a DPP company has avoided the gatekeeping function
served by a placement agent. Investors will be foregoing the protections that
come from transacting through a registered broker-dealer, mainly, know your
client, suitability, and due diligence obligations.

157

See supra Table 1, notes 126-55 and accompanying text.

158 See supra Table I, notes 126-55 and accompanying text.

and accompanying text.
Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7943, 66 Fed. Reg. 8887

159 See supra note 31

16o

(Mar. 7, 2ooi) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 230).
161 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. I12-Io6. § 201(b)(2), 126 Stat. 314 (2012).
162 See supra Table I, notes 126-55 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The advent of Rule 506(c) makes DPPs more workable, given companies
can now market them by any means and through any medium. In other words,
the importance of having access to a pre-existing pool of accredited investors
has decreased. However, adding general solicitation and advertising into the mix
makes state dealer and agent regulation tougher and therefore more expensive
to navigate. And things may get even tougher in this area for DPP companies
if state regulators decide to up regulatory intensity in response to the lifting of
the ban on general solicitation and advertising. Put differently, the registrations
impediment remains in full force and may get stronger.

